Himmler's Sonthofen Speeches

The speeches delivered by Heinrich Himmler at Sonthofen in May and June 1944 are often cited by exterminationists as evidence of a universal policy of Jewish genocide. However, critical analysis reveals that these speeches, addressed to Wehrmacht generals, primarily focus on internal security, anti-partisan warfare, and the strategic necessity of harsh measures during wartime. Far from confessing to a systematic extermination program, Himmler's words emphasize military and security imperatives, such as dismantling Jewish partisans in ghettos and preventing future threats. This article examines the Sonthofen speeches from a critical perspective, highlighting their alignment with documented German policies of evacuation, resettlement, and anti-partisan operations rather than genocide. It also includes a comparison to the earlier Posen speeches to underscore contextual differences and inconsistencies in exterminationist interpretations.

Background and Context

The Sonthofen speeches were given by Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer-SS, during a series of addresses to Wehrmacht generals at the Ordensburg Sonthofen in Bavaria between May and June 1944. These talks occurred amid escalating Allied bombings and the intensifying Eastern Front conflict, where partisan warfare posed significant threats to German supply lines and rear security. These speeches were tailored to a military audience, emphasizing the SS's role in supporting Wehrmacht operations through internal security measures, including the suppression of partisan networks often headquartered in Jewish ghettos. Exterminationists frequently point to passages in these speeches as admissions of mass murder, including women and children. However, such interpretations ignore the speeches' wartime security focus, reliance on typed transcripts of questionable provenance, and absence of any reference to extermination methods like gas chambers. Instead, the language reflects brutal anti-partisan reprisals, deemed justified to prevent "avengers" from arising — a rationale tied to specific guerrilla threats rather than racial genocide.

Key points:

Military-Strategic Emphasis: Himmler frames Jewish policy within the context of securing the rear against partisan sabotage, not as an ideological campaign of total annihilation.

Lack of Universal Scope: While mentioning the "Jewish question" broadly, the speeches tie harsh actions to partisan hotbeds like the Warsaw and Lublin ghettos, not to all Jews across Europe.

Document Authenticity Concerns: The speeches exist primarily as typed transcripts held in the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv), with possible postwar tampering. Audio recordings are incomplete, and discrepancies in handwriting and transcription raise doubts (see Authenticity section).

These elements suggest the speeches describe wartime necessities, not a "Final Solution" of racial extermination.

Analysis of the Sonthofen Speeches

5 May 1944 Speech

In this address, Himmler discusses the Jewish question as a matter of internal security amid bombing raids and partisan threats. He states: "The Jewish question has been solved in Germany and generally in the countries occupied by Germany. It has been resolved uncompromisingly in accordance with the life struggle of our people." Exterminationists interpret this as a confession of genocide, but revisionists note the military framing: Himmler links it to sustaining the bombing war and preventing sabotage, not racial extermination. Himmler justifies actions against women and children by invoking the threat of "hate-filled avengers," but ties this to the "confrontation with Asia [Russia]" and partisan contexts. He emphasizes: "In this confrontation with Asia, we must get used to condemning to oblivion the rules of the game and the customs of past European wars." This aligns with anti-partisan warfare, where reprisals sometimes targeted families to deter future resistance, rather than a blanket extermination policy.

Key insights:

• The speech avoids any mention of extermination methods or camps like Auschwitz, focusing instead on ghetto clearances (e.g., Warsaw) as security operations.
• Himmler's reference to Hitler's 1939 "prophecy" misquotes the original (which discussed annihilation through shifting public opinion, not physical killing), suggesting possible transcript alteration or rhetorical emphasis on security.
• The broader context praises the SS for maintaining order without "mental or spiritual damage," incompatible with overseeing industrialized genocide but fitting for harsh anti-partisan duties.

24 May 1944 Speech

Himmler reiterates: "The Jewish question was solved without compromise according to orders and rational knowledge." He again justifies child killings: "I did not consider myself entitled... to let the children grow up to be avengers who would then kill our children and our grandchildren." Exterminationists see this as genocidal intent, but revisionists highlight the tie to partisan warfare, such as the Warsaw ghetto uprising, described as "five weeks of street fighting" with "700 bunkers." Himmler stresses that Hungarian Jewish laborers (100,000 initially, then another 100,000) "will not come into the field of vision of the German people," underscoring isolation to prevent "poisoning" morale — consistent with evacuation and labor policies, not extermination.

Key insights:

• The speech frames the Jewish question as essential for "internal security," referencing ghettos as "headquarters of every partisan and every gang movement." This supports reprisals against resistance, not universal genocide.
• No mention of gassings or death camps; instead, it discusses labor utilization, contradicting claims of a policy to kill all Jews regardless of utility.
• Himmler's concern for "cleanliness and principle" in handling Jewish wealth emphasizes anti-corruption, not mass murder logistics.

21 June 1944 Speech

Himmler calls solving the Jewish question "the most terrible task and the most terrible order," achieved with "strength to eradicate the Jews in our area." He links it to preventing bombing war collapse and securing fronts like Lemberg, again citing ghetto clearances as the "last moment" to neutralize threats. Justifications for women and children mirror earlier speeches, tied to avengers in a post-Hitler era, but within partisan contexts (e.g., Warsaw's tunnels and bunkers).

Key insights:

• The speech explicitly notes: "The ghettos... were the headquarters of every partisan and every gang movement," framing actions as anti-partisan, not genocidal.
• Himmler contrasts this with broader security successes, implying the "Jewish question" was resolved through evacuation and isolation, not annihilation.
• The repetitive focus on "avengers" implies targeted killings of partisan-linked families, not all Jews — consistent with Wehrmacht reports of ghetto battles but absent in alleged extermination directives.

Sonthofen in Broader Context: No "Admission," Just Wartime Rhetoric

Exterminationists portray Sonthofen as a pivotal "confession," but this ignores Himmler's dozens of 1943-1945 speeches (e.g., NARA RG 242 collections), where ambiguous phrasing amid security discussions is routine — yet explicit non-homicidal policies dominate. Cherry-picking ignores the pattern: Evacuation/"transport to the East" as the "Jewish solution," not genocide. Himmler's 18 November 1943 Krakow address exemplifies this. To SS leaders in the General Government (near Auschwitz/Treblinka), Himmler — ostensibly much more free to speak about 'extermination' than he would be to Wehrmacht generals at Sonthofen — states: "Diese 16 Millionen, die früher noch vermehrt wurden durch eine Unzahl von Juden, die ja jetzt ausgewandert sind, nach dem Osten verbracht wurden..." ["These 16 million... increased by countless Jews, who have now emigrated, been transported to the East"] . This deportation focus is echoed a month later in Himmler's 16 December 1943 Weimar speech to German Navy commanders, describing "great migrations" where "so many Jews were deported to the East" alongside targeted anti-partisan orders: "If I was ever forced to take action against partisans and Jewish commissars in a village... I fundamentally gave the order to have the wives and children of these partisans and commissars killed as well" — explicitly limiting harsh measures to resistance threats, not all Jews . Such rhetoric predates Sonthofen — aligning its 'avengers' justifications with routine security operations — and in these 'insider' settings mentions no gassings or total killings, only deportation logistics.

Comparison to the Posen Speeches

The Posen speeches (4 and 6 October 1943) are often linked to Sonthofen by exterminationists, claiming both confess genocide. However, significant differences undermine this:

Audience and Focus: Posen addressed SS leaders on broader Jewish policy ("Judenevakuierung" or evacuation), emphasizing removal from the "German national body" without explicit mass killing references. Sonthofen targeted Wehrmacht generals, focusing on security and anti-partisan reprisals (e.g., Warsaw ghetto battles) .

Language and Justification: Posen uses "ausrotten" (extirpation/uprooting) synonymously with evacuation, rejecting killing men while sparing children as impractical [Posen 6 Oct]. Sonthofen's harsher tone justifies child killings as anti-partisan necessities, not universal policy — yet lacks Posen's evacuation terminology.

Inconsistencies in Exterminationist Views: If Posen's "code words" (e.g., evacuation) mask extermination, why does Sonthofen — later and to a less ideologically aligned audience — use more explicit language without methods? Suggests contextual specificity, not confession.

Temporal Context: Posen's past-tense ("eradicated") aligns with pre-1943 evacuations, while Sonthofen's future-oriented "avengers" concerns fit ongoing partisan threats. This pattern holds even earlier: In an October 1942 meeting with Mussolini (post-Wannsee), Himmler openly admitted shooting "a considerable number of Jews, both men and women" in Russia as "carriers of... sabotage, espionage... for the partisans," with Mussolini deeming it "the only possible solution." Yet Himmler detailed actual policies—concentration camps, Eastern road-building labor (high mortality noted), old-age homes in German cities, Theresienstadt as a "retirement ghetto," and pushing Jews across front lines to the Soviets—without any reference to extermination camps or total annihilation . No correlation supports a singular genocide narrative; instead, they reflect evolving wartime priorities.

NSDAP Program Parallels: Sonthofen's "Ausrottung" echoes Posen's link to the NSDAP program, which explicitly called for Jewish expulsion and denationalization, not extermination . Posen states: "The Jewish people will be extirpated... it's in our [NSDAP] programme: elimination of the Jews, extirpation" . This pre-war policy of non-lethal removal (revoking citizenship, forced emigration) aligns Sonthofen's security-focused language with evacuation and ghetto clearances, not genocide

As noted in the previous section, Himmler's December 1943 speech describes Jews as part of "great migrations" where "so many Jews... have emigrated to the East" . This explicit reference to eastward deportation contradicts exterminationist claims of a universal killing policy, aligning Sonthofen with targeted anti-partisan actions rather than genocide.

Goebbels' Diary Parallels

Goebbels' diary, as a private record from a top National Socialist ideologue, consistently describes the Final Solution as evacuation and resettlement rather than extermination across 1942-1943. This non-homicidal view aligns Sonthofen's "solution without compromise" with escalated deportations and security measures, not genocide. The Oct 7, 1943 entry (immediately after Posen) frames Himmler's speech as radicalizing policy to "root out [auszurotten] the whole of Jewry" via Eastern resettlement, echoing earlier logs: "liquidate [liquidieren] the Jewish danger... resettle them in central Africa" (May 30, 1942), and willingness to export Jews to Sweden so "nothing could be better" (Dec 17, 1942). Goebbels tied actions to "internal security" (e.g., "shoot more Jews" only as agitators, Mar 16, 1942) and wartime opportunities: "the war... has made possible... the solution of a whole series of problems" like evacuation (Mar 20, 1943). Pre-Posen, this mindset is evident in mid-1943 entries showing urban evacuation as "radical/brutal": On 17 July 1943, Goebbels urged solving Berlin's Jewish problem by "removing" remaining Jews en masse for "internal security" (Goebbels Diary, 17 Jul), where lingering urban presence posed threats — echoed in May-June 1943's focus on "purification" (e.g., 25 Jun: "glad... no Jews behind us" amid security fears). By October, this escalated to continental "auszurotten," but still meant thorough removal, not killing, amid such pressures (e.g., disrupted logistics, family separations). Goebbels explicitly logged logistics (e.g., "shipped to the East," "deport to ghettos," Apr 27, 1942) without homicidal intent, even as "Final Solution" in full-swing. Sonthofen's ghetto-focused language (e.g., Warsaw as partisan "headquarters") fits this evacuation/security paradigm, framing "rooting out" as intensified removal, not extermination.

Authenticity and Potential Tampering

Revisionists question the Sonthofen transcripts' reliability, citing postwar custody by Allies (notorious for fabrications) and inconsistencies:

Typed Transcripts: All exist as typescripts (Bundesarchiv NS 19 series), with possible additions. Handwritten notes are vague, and audio is missing important parts of "incriminating" segments.

Discrepancies: Himmler's misquote of Hitler's 1939 prophecy in the 5 May Sonthofen speech (original 1939: "Vernichtung" as a mere public opinion shift; Sonthofen: "Ausrottung" to mean 'killing') suggests possible alteration.

Missing Evidence: Audio for most speeches lacks context for Jewish-related segments; transcripts' provenance (seized in Berlin under Soviet occupation) raises forgery concerns .

Problems with Secrecy: Inconsistent secrecy — veiled at Wannsee (1942) and Posen (1943), explicit at Sonthofen (1944) — defies logic for a "secret" genocide, especially given the audience of Wehrmacht generals who should not be privy to such classified information.

Postwar Denials by Attendees: Wehrmacht generals like Erich von Manstein and Franz Halder, who attended Sonthofen, denied knowledge of systematic extermination postwar. If Himmler explicitly confessed genocide, such denials would be less likely, suggesting the speeches were understood as security measures rather than universal killing, or possible tampering post-war.

Concluding Thoughts

Himmler's Sonthofen speeches, when examined in full context, reveal a focus on wartime security and anti-partisan reprisals, not evidence of universal Jewish extermination. Exterminationist interpretations cherry-pick phrases while ignoring military emphases, authenticity issues, and alignment with evacuation policies. The pattern across Himmler's dozens of speeches — from the 1942 Mussolini talk's targeted partisan shootings amid evacuation/labor policies, explicit Eastern deportations in Krakow (Nov 1943) and Weimar (Dec 1943) with reprisals limited to partisan families, to Goebbels' contemporaneous logs emphasizing resettlement — confirms Sonthofen as no "admission," but routine wartime rhetoric. Compared to Posen, Sonthofen lacks evacuation language and ties killings to specific threats, undermining claims of a cohesive genocide confession. Postwar denials by attendees, like Wehrmacht generals, further highlight the speeches' non-genocidal intent. Objective analysis supports viewing these as brutal but targeted wartime measures, challenging the Holocaust narrative's politicized foundations.